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COURTS OF SPECIALIZED JURISDICTION IN
AUSTRALIA
ERIC ARMOUR BEECROVT

The Australian Constitution,' like that of the United States,
provides for a threefold division of powers, chapter I providing
for the legislature, chapter II for the executive and chapter III
for the judicature. Section 71 under chapter III reads as follows:
"The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be
vested in a Federal Supreme Court, to be called the High
Court of Australia, and in such other federal courts as the
Parliament creates, and in such other courts as it invests
with federal jurisdiction. The High Court shall consist
of a Chief Justice, and so many other Justices, not less than
two, as the Parliament prescribes."
Section 72 provides that the justices of all such courts shall be
appointed by the Governor-General, shall be removable only on
an address of both Houses of Parliament, and shall receive a
remuneration which shall not be diminished during their term
of office.

2

One might think, from the words of these sections, that the
court-creating power which is thereby vested in Parliament is
exclusive, that is, that Parliament can create no courts except
those which are to exercise "the judicial power of the Commonwealth" and that all federal courts, when created, must conform
to section 72 and the other sections of chapter III. It is true
that chapter III does limit and control the creation by Parliament
3
of courts exercising "the judicial power of the Commonwealth",
but the High Court has recognized another class of tribunals
'Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 63 & 64 VicT. c. 12 (igoo).
2Cf. Art. III, § i of the American Constitution: "The judicial power of
the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior
courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges,
both of the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good
behavior, and shall at stated times receive for their services a compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office."
'New South Wales v. The Commonwealth, 20 C. L. R. 54 (1915), discussed
infra p
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exercising some judicial functions and employing judicial procedure. These tribunals do not, however, in the opinion of the
High Court, exercise "the judicial power of the Commonwealth",
and therefore do not derive their authority from the provisions of
chapter III of the Constitution, nor are they in any way controlled by the provisions of that chapter.
Where, then, do these tribunals derive their constitutional
validity? The answer is that they are created under other constitutional powers granted to the Federal Parliament,-for example, the power to regulate trade and commerce with other countries
and among the states, the power to tax, the power to make laws
with respect to patents and trade marks, immigration and emigration, and conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and
settlement of industrial disputes. Section 51 (xxxix) of the Constitution 4 reinforces the legislative powers of the Commonwealth
just as the "necessary and proper" clause reinforces the powers
granted to Congress. These tribunals, then, possess a specialized
jurisdiction. They are not concerned with what Blackstone, in
the Commentaries,' referred to as "the administration of common
justice".
It is with these specialized courts, which are established
under clauses other than those of chapter III-one might call
them non-chapter III courts-that this paper is concerned. 6
I.

THE COURT OF CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION

Section 51 (xxxv) of the Australian Constitution grants
to Parliament power with respect to "conciliation and arbitration
for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending
beyond the limits of any one State". Parliament, therefore, canSec. 5I (xxxix) : Parliament shall have power to make laws with respect to "matters incidental to the execution of any power vested by this Constitution in the Parliament or in either House thereof, or in the Government of
the Commonwealth, or in the Federal Judicature, or in any department or officer
of the Commonwealth."
'I BL Co M'M. 269.
This class of tribunals has been recognized in the United States under the
rather inappropriate designation of "Legislative Courts." See Ex parte Bakelite
Corporation, 279 U. S. 438, 49 Sup. Ct. 411 (1929), where the two classes of
courts have been clearly distinguished by the Supreme Court; also FRANKFURTER
AND LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT (1927) c. IV, and Katz,
Federal Legislative Courts (193o) 43 HARv. L. REv. 894.
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not make any laws with respect to industrial conditions, for most
of such power is reserved to the states. It is limited to the one
method of dealing with industrial conditions provided for in
section 51 (xxxv).
Soon after the establishment of the federal government,
Parliament passed the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904. Under this Act there was established a Court of
Conciliation and Arbitration which, according to section i i of the
Act, was to be a "Court of Record". It was to consist of a
President appointed by the Governor-General from among the
justices of the High Court, entitled to hold office for seven years,
eligible for reappointment, and liable to removal only on the
address of both Houses of Parliament. 7 The President was given

authority to appoint as his deputy any justice of the High Court
or judge of the supreme court of a state.s
This court (which I shall call the Arbitration Court) began
its work in 1905. In the years immediately following, it was
necessary for the High Court to decide many cases involving
an interpretation of the Arbitration Act and the constitutional
provision under which it was authorized. Among the questions
involved was that of the real nature of the Arbitration Court
and its functions. In making up its mind, or minds, on this matter, the High Court divided sharply.
The first concrete case in which this division occurred was
the Bootmakers' case 9 in 19o. The Australian Boot Trade
Employees Federation had brought a complaint in the Arbitration Court in which they made a certain claim. 10 The matter
was heard by the President, who, after hearing evidence and
arguments, drew up the minutes of his proposed award. Before
he would attempt to put the award into effect, however, he stated
' Sec. 12.

'Sec. 14.
'Australian Boot Trade Employes Federation v. Whybrow & Co., Io C. L.
R. 266 (1gio). In a previous case, Federated Saw Mill Employees' Assoc. v.
Moore, 8 C. L. R- 465 (igo9), substantially the same questions were considered
at length for the first time by the High Court, but owing to the hypothetical
character of the case, the opinions of the judges were not regarded as conclusive.
104

Comm. Arbit. Repts. i (19o9).
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a case "l for the determination of the High Court of the following questions:
"i. Is it competent for this Commonwealth Court under
the Federal Constitution to make any award which is inconsistent with any and if so which of the said awards or
determinations of the State Wages Boards?
"2. Is there in the proposed award any provision or provisions and if so what provision or provisions inconsistent
with any and if so which of the awards or determinations of
the States Wages Boards, and in what respects ?"
A majority of the High Court held that the Arbitration
Court had no jurisdiction under section 51 (xxxv) of the Constitution to make an award inconsistent with a state law. The
determination of a Wages Board, empowered by a state statute
to fix a minimum rate of wages, might be such a law, depending
upon the terms of the statute under which it was made. The
awards and determinations of the State Wages Boards in question
in the present case had the force of law under the statutes. Mr.
Justice Barton pointed out that:
"the Wages Boards are not tribunals of arbitration, but subsidiary legislative bodies deriving their authority from the
State legislatures . . . The rates of wages, when fixed by
the Boards, are to all intents and purposes the law on the
subject. They are as distinct from the judgment of a Court
as they are from the award of an arbitrator." 12
This last sentence is the key to the difference of opinion in
the court. The majority were unwilling to admit that an award
of the Arbitration Court was the result of a legislative act, in other
words, that the Arbitration Court was a subsidiary legislative
body. If they had so admitted they would have been compelled
to concede further, that an award of the Federal Arbitration
Court took precedence over any state law including the deterU Sec. 31 (2) of the Arbitration Act i9o4 provides that "the President may,
if he thinks fit, in any proceeding before the Court, at any stage and upon such
terms as he thinks fit, state a case in writing for the opinion of the High Court
upon any question arising in the proceeding which in his opinion is a question
of law."
12 Supra note 9, at 289.
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minations and awards of State Wages Boards, by force of the
plain meaning of section 1O9 of the Constitution.' 3 Such an
interpretation would have been repugnant to the habitual "statesrights" attitude of the three judges who formed the majority.
Hence this supposedly unthinkable and unwarranted extension of
federal powers was avoided by maintaining that the function of
the Arbitration Court was judicial and not legislative and that,
therefore, its awards were judicial determinations and not legislative enactments.
How confused were the minds of Chief Justice Griffith and
Sir Edmund Barton on this issue is very evident in their opinions. 14 The strong language they used indicates how outraged
they were at the very suggestion that a single "judicial" officer
of the Commonwealth could render void every state enactment
regulating industrial conditions. To approve such a doctrine,
they thought, would be to uphold the most despotic power. They
both insisted vigorously that the function of an arbitrator is like
that of a judge, in that it is for him to declare the law and not
to make it. They held out stubbornly for this view in the face of
the very lucid and realistic statement of Mr. Justice Isaacs, showing that the Arbitration Court did not declare existing rights and
obligations, but actually created new law.1'
Mr. Justice Isaacs and Mr. Justice Higgins (the latter was
President of the Arbitration Court) dissented. The former
expressed his disagreement with the theory that the duty of the
Arbitration Court was to declare law rather than to make it.
What law did it declare? There was no Commonwealth law
" Sec. log: "When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid."
" See especially supra note 9, at 284, 294 and 297.
' Mr. Justice Barton declared that "beyond alr question the award is a
judicial determination. That, at least, has never been the subject of doubt,
whether in a Court or elsewhere." (Supra note 9, at 294) ; and further: "The
Australian Constitution is no less careful than other fundamental laws to clearly
separate the judicial from the legislative authority and to define their respective
functions, and it is too much to ask us to believe that, by the words used in this
power, it has sanctioned their collocation in one and the same authority, and
that primarily a judicial one." (Supra note 9, at 297.) Chief Justice Griffith
made this statement: "The legislative and judicial powers of a sovereign state
are exercised by different agencies, whose operations are in different planes,
and cannot come in conflict with one another." (Supra note 9, at 284.)
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regulating industrial conditions. The Constitution had no specific
provisions on the subject. There was no enactment of Parliament
on which the rules prescribed by the President of the Arbitration
Court were founded. There was, in fact, no statute law which
he was called upon to interpret and apply, as an ordinary judicial
tribunal would have to do; and the common law admittedly did
not bind him. "If then", asked Mr. Justice Isaacs, "his determination is not in the nature of a law, just as is the determination
of a Wages Board, by what authority is anyone bound by it?" 16
Mr. Justice Isaacs then distinguished a judicial and a legislative act:
"If the dispute is as to the relative rights of parties as
they rest on past or present circumstances, the award is in the
nature of a judgment, which might have been the decree of
an ordinary judicial tribunal acting under ordinary judicial
power. There the law applicable to the case must be observed. If, however, the dispute is as to what shall in the
future be the mutual rights and responsibilities of the parties-in other words, if no present rights are asserted or
denied, but a future rule of conduct is to be prescribed, thus
creating new rights and obligations, with sanctions for nonconformity-then the determination that so prescribes, call
it an award, or arbitrament, determination, or decision or
what you will, is essentially of a legislative character, and
limited only by the law which authorizes it." 17
Mr. Justice Isaacs argued further that the combined effect
of section 51 (xxxv) with section 51 (xxxix) of the Constitution
was to grant the Arbitration Court the extensive legislative power
which he believed it was intended to possess. Here, inevitably,
" Supra note 9, at 313.
' 7 Sitpra note 9, at 318. Mr. Justice Isaacs refers to the similar distinction
made by Mr. Justice Holmes in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S.
210, 226, 29 Sup. Ct. 67, 70 (i9o8).
He quotes the statement that "the nature of
the final act determines the nature o.f the previous inquiry." He quotes also
with approval from Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U. S. I, 8, 29 Sup.
Ct. 148, 1.5o (19o9) : "The function of rate-making is purely legislative in character, and this is true. whether it is exercised directly by the legislature itself
or by some subordinate or administrative body to whom the power of fixing
rates in detail has been delegated. The completed act derives its authority from
the legislature and must be regarded as an exercise of legislative power."
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he invoked the authority of McCulloch v. Maryland.' Mr. Justice
Higgins repeated substantially the same views. a s
The instability of the prevailing doctrine is obvious enough,
considering that it was upheld by a mere majority of one. But
add to this the wavering and unsettled view of Mr. Justice O'Connor, and it becomes evident that the decision in the Bootmakers'
case by no means created a settled doctrine. Mr. Justice O'Connor,
though he stood with the majority in this case, admitted that in
some circumstances state laws must be disregarded. 2 0 It might
be proper, he said, in some cases, for the Arbitration Court to
ignore state laws in order to make an effective settlement of a
dispute. But, beyond that, the power of the court was limited by
the word "arbitration" itself.
There is no doubt, as I have already indicated, that the decision in the Bootinakers' case was highly colored by the attitude
of the three majority judges toward the extension of federal
powers. 21 Their desire to regard arbitration as attributable to the
judicial department rather than to the legislative department was
due partly to their preconceptions concerning the separation of
powers, but perhaps even more largely to their desire to uphold
state authority. This is evident from the concessions made by
Mr. Justice O'Connor, from the reluctance of the Chief Justice to
say outright that an arbitration award was not a law and from
the failure of the majority to give clear reasons for distinguishing
3B4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 18ig).
"In the United States, the precedence of federal administrative orders and
rules made by federal boards and commissions over laws and regulations of the
states has usually been taken for granted. See, e. g., Houston v. Moore, 5
Wheat. i (U. S. 182o) ; Columbia Wire Co. v. Freeman Wire Co., 7i Fed. 302
(C. C. Mo. 1895) ; Looney v. East Texas R. R. Co., 247 U. S. 214, 38 Sup. Ct.
46o (1918); and the Transportation Act of Feb. 28, 192o, § 4o2, par. 17, 41
STAT. 456, at 477 (1921), 49 U. S. C. A. § i (lO-22) (1929).
'Supra note 9, at 3o5-3o7.

2
As to the principles of "strict construction" which the senior judges ,followed so consistently in the early days, see Kennedy, Some Aspects of Caadian
and Australian Federal Constitutimal Law (193o) 15 CoRN.. L. Q. 345, 352 et
seq.

It may be worth noting that, in the Federal Convention, in 1898, both Sir
Edmund Barton and Mr. R. E. O'Connor (later to become High Court Justices) opposed the inclusion of the arbitration clause in the constitution, mainly
on the ground that it interfered with powers which rightly belonged to the
states. See i

RECORDS OF AusTAxL.AN FFnmAuL CoNvENiox (1898)

199-2o2.
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between the effect of the awards of the federal court and the
effect of the determinations of State Wages Boards.
The same questions were raised again in an important litigation eight years later. By this time the personnel of the bench
had changed considerably. Mr. Justice O'Connor had died and
had been replaced by Mr. Frank Gavan Duffy. The number of
judges had been increased to seven with the addition of Messrs.
Powers and Rich. These three latest appointees were younger
men and were less solicitous of "state-rights" than the older
judges.
Alexander's case 22 in 1918 arose out of a hearing before the
Arbitration Court of an application that the Arbitration Court
should impose a penalty on J. W. Alexander Ltd., for
the breach of a certain award. Some questions of law
were raised which the President of the court stated for the
opinion of the High Court. One of these was the contention of the respondent that the Arbitration Court had
no power to enforce awards, inasmuch as the President was,
under section 12 of the Arbitration Act, appointed for seven years
only, contrary to section 72 of the Constitution which provided
that every judge of a federal court must be appointed on good
behavior. It was also contended that an award of the Arbitration
Court was invalid, since such an award was a judicial determination by a federal court, and since the judge of that court was
not appointed for life according to the terms of section 72 of the
Constitution. The far-reaching character of these questions,
involving the very existence of the Arbitration Court itself, led to
a lengthy expression of opinion by the justices.
Six of the justices decided that an award of the court was
not invalid by reason of the appointment of the President for seven
years only. Four of these, including the two junior members
of the bench, based their judgment on the ground stated by Mr.
Justice Isaacs in the Bootmakers' case, to wit, that the Arbitration Court was not a judicial body, and the conditions specified in
section 72 of the Constitution did not apply to it. Mr. Justice
' Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v. J. W. Alexander, Ltd.,
25 C. L. R. 434 (1918).
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Duffy did not deny that it was a judicial body, but held that
section 72 did not prohibit an appointment for seven years only.
It merely prevented removal during the prescribed term of office
except on addresses of both Houses of Parliament.
Chief Justice Griffith held to his former view that the Arbitration Court was a judicial body, but by some ingenious juggling
of words he maintained that the appointment of a President of
the Arbitration Court was not affected by section 72. Section
12 of the Arbitration Act, he pointed out, had provided that the
President of the Arbitration Court should be a justice of the High
Court, in other words, a person already holding judicial office
during good behavior. Furthermore, he said, the word "appoint"
in section 12 of the Act meant "assign" or "designate". Therefore section 12 should be read to mean that the Governor-General
should "assign" or "designate" a justice of the High Court to be
President of the Arbitration Court.
Mr. Justice Barton held strictly to his former view that the
Arbitration Court was a court in the strict sense, that part of the
judicial power is reposed in it, and that the act creating it must be
interpreted in the light of the judicature chapter of the Constitution.
The joint opinion of Justices Isaacs and Rich in this case
contains some refinements upon the opinion of the former in the
Bootmakers' case. It shows less eagerness to attribute law-making
power in the strict sense to the Arbitration Court. The duty
of the arbitrator is, of course, not to ascertain and declare rights,
but to determine whether new rights claimed ought to be conceded
in whole or in part. "But he does not legislate. It is always the
statute which gives the arbitrator's opinion efficacy, and stamps
his decision with the character of a legal right or obligation." The
work of the arbitrator, then, would seem to be, not a direct exercise of the legislative power, but a function ancillary to the legislative power. "The award provides the factun upon which the
law operates to create the right or duty." 23
There is evident in this opinion, as in those of Justices
Higgins and Powers, a more liberal attitude toward the doctrine
- Supra note

22, at 463-464.
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of the separation of powers, an attitude which in recent years
has also been forced more and more upon the American Supreme
Court in dealing with the status of rule-making boards and commissions. There is evident a clearer understanding on the part
of the judges of the underlying social and governmental changes
which have necessitated the development of new procedures. It is
a common habit of the legal mind to attempt to bring every new
entity under an old category. Some of the High Court justices,
originally a majority, seemed to assume that this new institution,
the Arbitration Court, must be brought within one of the three
branches of government provided for in the Constitution-legislative, executive or judicial. The name of the court, the functions
assigned to it in the Act, the procedure employed by it-all of
these features made it appear as a judicial body. It did not occur
to the High Court at first to regard it simply as a new type of
institution, a new instrument for dealing with new problems,
and falling precisely within none of the old categories.
It should be added that, in accordance with the view of the
majority of the High Court that the Arbitration Court was not
a judicial body, it was decided in Alexander's case that it could
not exercise the powers of a court and enforce its own awards.
The function of the Arbitration Court was again considered
in Clyde Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Cowburn. 24 Here the question arose whether an award 25 of the Arbitration Court, fixing
the hours of labor in certain industries at forty-eight, took precedence over the Forty-Four Hours' Act of New South Wales.
Again it became necessary to consider the contention that
an arbitration award was not a "law of the Commonwealth"
within the meaning of section 1O9 of the Constitution.
The court decided unanimously that the Parliament of a state
could not pass an act which was inconsistent with an award of
the Arbitration Court. Mr. Justice Isaacs again gave the clearest
explanation of the functions of that tribunal:
"The Federal Arbitration Court is not a law-maker,
but it is an 'award-maker', just as the Governor-General-in237

20

C. L. R. 466 (1926).

Comm. Arb. Repts. 982 (1924).
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Council is an 'order-maker', or a municipal council is a
'bylaw-maker', or a Court of law is a 'rule-maker'. And if
Parliament, unable or unwilling,-it matters not which-to
legislate in detail or with reference to a specific instance, but
having the authority to empower, does empower a named
functionary to formulate what he thinks a proper rule, ...
his formulation, though not a law, may be adopted by Parliament so as to be a law." 26
It would appear, then, that the opinion of Mr. Justice Isaacs
has become, instead of a minority opinion, as it was in i9IO, the
27
unanimous opinion of the court.
Another case worthy of notice is Australian Commonwealth
Shipping Board et al. v. The Federated Seamen's Union.2 8

The

applicant in this case asked the Arbitration Court to cancel the
registration of the respondent union.2 9 Deputy-President Webb,
before whom the matter was brought for hearing, was doubtful
of the power of the Arbitration Court to cancel the registration
of an organization, since it appeared, from Alexander's case, that
the Arbitration Court could not be invested with any part of the
judicial power of the Commonwealth. He therefore stated a
case for the opinion of the High Court on this and other questions.
The court decided that section 6o of the Arbitration Act did not
confer judicial power upon the Arbitration Court. It was therefore a valid enactment of Parliament and the Arbitration Court
might, as a result, order the registration of an organization to be
cancelled. Chief Justice Knox pointed out that in the Jumbunna
"Supra note 24, at 494-495. Mr. Justice Starke, who, as counsel, had argued for the invalidity of the awards in Alexander's case, in 1918, in this case
upheld the paramount authority of the federal awards.
-'It is interesting, in view of the Cowbunt decision, to recall the words of
Sir Samuel Griffith and Sir Edmund Barton in the Bootmakers' case. The
Cowburn decision has brought about the very situation which the former feared
when he said: "The notion of any one person or set of persons being set up in
a civilized country with authority to supersede or abrogate any law of which he
does not approve is to me so extraordinary that I can hardly conceive of any
legislature in full possession of its faculties setting up such an institution."
Bootmakers' case, supra note 9, at 284.
'36 C. L. R. 442 (1925).

' Sec. 6o of the Arbitration Act gives to the Registrar of the Arbitration
Court power to cancel the registration of an organization under certain circumstances.

1032

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

Coal Mine case,30 years before, it had been decided that the grant
of power to register organizations was incidental to the exercise
of the power to make laws with respect to conciliation and arbitration, and that the power to deregister was in the same position.
Other members of the court said that the employment of some
judicial methods and the exercise of some judicial functions did
not make the Arbitration Court a judicial body, and that from a
constitutional standpoint, its existence and its procedure were
justified under the arbitration clause of the Constitution, and it
was not controlled by the provisions of chapter III.
The general result of these decisions was to put the Court
of Arbitration in the same position as the so-called legislative
courts in the United States, deriving its authority from a source
other than the judicature chapter of the Constitution.
This situation, however, has been modified by the enactment
of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1926.
This Act conferred upon the members of the court a tenure on
31
good behavior in accordance with section 72 of the Constitution.
The court, therefore, can now exercise "the judicial power of the
Commonwealth" as a federal court created by Parliament under
section 71, and its authority is derived from both section 71 and
section 51 (xxxv) of the Constitution. The titles of its members were changed to Chief Judge and Judges in order to emphasize the change that was made in its character. The change was
made on account of the widespread belief that the Arbitration
Court should have power to interpret its own awards and to
enforce penalties for their breach, instead of leaving these functions to police magistrates who were relatively unfamiliar with
industrial matters. 32 These judicial powers have been exercised
freely by the judges of the court since the Act of 1926 went into
8
effect.
'Jumbunna

(19o8).

Coal Mine v. Victorian Coal Miners' Ass'n, 6 C. L. R. 3o9

Sec. 6.
Parliamentary Debates, (House) May

21, 1926, 2233-2238; June 17, 32073268; June 18, 3294-3319; (Senate) June 23, 3366-34oi.
' A special arbitration tribunal, modeled on the Court of Conciliation and
Arbitration, to determine claims as to salaries and terms of employment in the
Public Service, was established under the Arbitration (Public Service) Act of
1920.
Such matters had formerly, under the Arbitration (Public Service) Act
of 1911, been dealt with by the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration.
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II. THE INCOME TAx ASSESSMENT BOARDS
The Income Tax Assessment Act of 1922 provided for the
establishment of boards of appeal for the purpose of dealing with
appeals and references from the Commissioner of Taxation. A
Board of Appeal was empowered under the Act to hear cases
referred to it by the Commissioner, 34 and to make such an order
as it thought fit and either to reduce or to increase the assessment.3" A taxpayer was allowed the right to appeal from the
decisions of the Commissioner either: (a) to the High Court
or the supreme court of a state (where the objection raised only
questions of law); or (b) to the High Court or a supreme court
or a Board of Appeal (where the objection raised questions of
fact). 3' An order of a board on questions of fact was to be
final and conclusive on all parties, 37 and an order by a court was
to be final and conclusive with respect to both law and fact except
as provided in section 51, sub-sections 6 and S.'s
Section 28, sub-section i of the same Act provided that,
where a business is controlled principally outside of Australia,
the person carrying on the business in Australia should be assessable to income tax on such percentage of the total receipts of the
business as the Commissioner in his judgment thought proper.
Section 28, sub-section 3, provided that, on the request of a taxpayer who was dissatisfied with the decision of the Commissioner
under this section, "his case" would be referred to a Board of
Appeal.
An important case arose under this latter section in 1925, the
British Imperial Oil Co. Ltd. v. The Federal Commissioner of
Taxation.39 On the hearing of the appeal, a case was stated by
Sec. 44 (I).
Secs. 44 (2) and 51 W).
Sec. 50 (4).
Sec. 51 (2).
Sec. 51 (3). Sec. 5, (6) reads: "On the hearing of the appeal the Board
shall, on the request of a party, and the Court may, i~f the Court thinks fit, state
a case in writing for the opinion of the High Court upon any question arising
in the appeal which in the opinion of the Board or of the Court, as the case
may be, is a question of law." Sec. 5I (8) reads: "An appeal shall lie to the
High Court, in its appellate jurisdiction, from any order made under sub-section (i) of this section except a decision by the Board on a question of fact."
3935
C. L. R. 422 (1925).

1034

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

the board for the opinion of the High Court.4" The appellant
contended that sub-section 3 of section 28 was invalid, because
Parliament had attempted by sections 44, 50 and 51 of the Act
to confer a part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth upon
a Board of Appeal, which, as constituted by section 41 was not a
court upon which that power could be conferred, section 41 subsection 4 having provided for a seven-year tenure of office for the
members of such a board. Appellants argued further that since
section 28, sub-section 3 was not severable from the rest of section
28, the whole section was invalid, and that therefore they would
not be liable to the assessment in question.
It will be observed that this was the same ground on which
the power of the Arbitration Court to enforce its awards was
challenged in Alexander's case. Alexander's case was therefore
invoked in this case as authority for the principle that the judicial
power of the Commonwealth could only be vested in courts, that
is, to use Chief Justice Knox's words, "courts of law in the strict
sense". And members of such courts must be appointed for life
subject to the power of removal contained in section 72 of the
Constitution.
Of the Board of Appeal, Chief Justice Knox observed:
"the power conferred on the Board of determining questions of law, the association of the Board as a tribunal of
appeal with the High Court and the Supreme Court of a
State, and the provision for an appeal to the High Court in
its appellate jurisdiction from any order of the Board, except
a decision on a question of fact, in my opinion establish that
the expressed intention of Parliament was to confer on the
Board portion of the judicial power of the Commonwealth,
which at any rate includes the power to adjudicate between
adverse parties as to legal claims, rights and obligations, and
to order right to be done in the matter."
The court decided without dissent (Higgins, J., took no part
in the decision) that the Board of Appeal which Parliament purported to create was not lawfully constituted in the form provided
for in the Assessment Act.
, See see. 51 (6), quoted supra note 38.

COURTS IN AUSTRALIA

There was undoubtedly a difference between the constitution
of the Board of Appeal under the Assessment Act and that of the
Arbitration Court as it existed at the time of Alexander's case,
a sufficiently marked distinction to account for the difference in
the attitude of the High Court in the two cases. The Arbitration
Court, it is true, possessed final and conclusive power in making
awards, but such awards were in no sense adjudications of rights
under existing laws. On the other hand, the Boards of Appeal,
in making their determinations, were bound by the provisions of a
detailed statute, which specified the rights and obligations of the
taxpayers. Moreover, from the awards of the Arbitration Court,'
there was no appeal to the High Court "in its appellate jurisdiction" 41 as in the case of the Boards under the Assessment Act.
As a direct result of the decision in the British Imperial Oil
Co. case, the Income Tax Assessment Act was amended in 1925.
Parliament, apparently, endeavored with the greatest care to steer
clear of the judicial rocks which had been charted in that case. 42
"Boards of Appeal" were renamed "Boards of Review", and the
seven-year tenure of office was retained. 3 Section 44 of the
principal Act was amended to read:
"A Board of Review shall have power to review such
decisions of the Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner, or
Deputy Commissioner as are referred to it by the Commissioner under this Act . . . and the decisions of the Board

of Review shall, for all purposes (except for the purposes
of sub-sec. (4) of sec. 50 and sub-sec. (6) of sec. 51 of
this Act) be deemed to be assessments, determinations or
decisions of the Commissioner."
A taxpayer dissatisfied with a decision of the Commissioner was
allowed to request the Commissioner: (a) to refer the decision
to a Board of Review for review, or (b) to treat his objection
as an appeal and to forward it either to the High Court or to the
supreme court of a state. 4 4 On such a reference or appeal, the
" It was so held in the Tramways case (No. z), 18 C. L. . 54 (1914).
Parliamentary Debates, (House) July 17 and Sept. 17,

and 2515-2530;
(Senate) Sept. 23, 1925, 2604-2609.
' 3 Sec. 41 (1) and (4) of the amended Act.
Sec. 50 (4).

1925, 1275-,279
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board, or court, as the case might be, might confirm, reduce, increase or vary the assessment.4 5 In the case of appeals to a court,
they were to be dealt with by a single justice. 46 An appeal was
allowed to the High Court from any decision of a Board which,
47
in the opinion of the High Court involved a question of law.
An appeal was also allowed to the High Court in its appellate
jurisdiction from any order made by a justice of the High Court
48
or a supreme court of a state.
Having made these alterations in the constitution and powers
of the boards, Parliament, by sections 18 to 21 of the amending
Act, purported to validate the decisions of the body of persons
de facto acting as a Board of Appeal under the earlier Act by providing that all such decisions should be deemed to have been decisions of a Board of Review given in pursuance of the provisions
of the later Act, and by providing that the Commissioner or the
taxpayer might appeal to the High Court from such a decision (as
if it were a decision of a Board of Review).
By virtue of this latter provision the case of the Federal
Commissioner of Taxation v. Munro 49 came before the High
Court. It was an appeal under section 51, sub-section 6 of the
Income Tax Assessment Act of 1925, from a decision of a Board
of Appeal constituted by the Act of 1922. Thus, it involved
a question as to the validity of the new provisions for the Board
of Review. 50 It was contended that the Act of 1925, like that of
1922, purported to confer on the Board of Review part of the
judicial power of the Commonwealth, which by sections 71 and 72
of the Constitution could be vested only in a court possessing
a life tenure. The entire court, with the exception of Chief Justice
Knox, rejected this argument, distinguished the Act of 1925 from
the former Act and decided that the powers which it, by sections
44, 50 and 51, purported to confer on the Board of Review were
Secs. 5I (4) and 51A (s).
"Sec. 51A (2).

' 7 Sec. 5i (6).

"sSec. 5IA (I0).

4938 C. L. R. 153 (1926).
&0
There was a preliminary argument by counsel as to whether § 18 was invalid as authorizing a thing which was contrary to the Constitution. This argument was ignored by most of the court.
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not part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth and therefore
not invalid. The Chief Justice believed that, since the Board of
Review was to adjudicate in contests between parties (that is, the
taxpayer and the officer representing the Commonwealth) to
determine their respective rights under the law, and since a right
of appeal to a court of law was allowed, the power exercised by
the board was judicial power and therefore unconstitutional.
Mr. Justice Isaacs insisted that the difference in nature between the new board and the old was "the difference between daylight and dark". The former was clearly intended by Parliament
to exercise "judicial power". That intention was clear from the
constitution of the tribunal. Not so with the new board. Mr.
Justice Isaacs made a detailed analysis of the provisions of the
Act, pointing out the punctilious care which Parliament had
exercised in making the Board of Review conform to the opinion
of the court.
"Instead of assimilating the Board to the Court, as in
the old sec. 44, the Board in the new sec. 44 is assimilated to
the Commissioner .

.

. The Crown is bound by all opin-

ions of the Board on pure matters of fact-that is, on true
administration of the law-but as to law, the Court and not
the Board is to determine. The appeal being given to the
Court in its original jurisdiction only-which is manifest
when sec. 50 (4) (b) and sec. 51 A (2) and (io)

are com-

pared-it follows necessarily that the Board's decision is
not intended to be an exercise of the judicial power." r"
Mr. Justice Isaacs quotes Lord Haldane as saying that "the tendency of modern legislation has recently been to entrust to
many who are prima facie only administrative officers, functions
which have some judicial attributes at all events, although they
remain primarily administrators".5 2 The main purpose in this
case, says Mr. Justice Isaacs, is an executive purpose, the enforcement of the tax legislation. The decisions of the Board of Review may very appropriately be designated by Lord Haldane's
term, "administrative awards". What appears to be judicial conduct is merely the incidental determination in a judicial manner
' Supra note 49, at 183.

' Everett v. Griffiths,

[1921]

A. C. 631, 659.
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of facts, for the purpose of carrying out executive functions in
a just way.
Mr. Justice Higgins repeated with approval the argument of
the Commissioner's counsel to the effect that Parliament had
power under section 51 (ii) of the Constitution to make laws
"with respect to taxation", which, combined with the ancillary
power granted in section 51 (xxxix), gave Parliament power
to create bodies which were not courts within the meaning of
chapter III of the Constitution.5 3 Parliament could devise any
machinery which it thought fit to assist the Commissioner in his
functions in respect to taxation. "The board", he said, "ought to
be treated as a mere piece of administrative machinery."
One other case under this Act should be mentioned. In 1927,
an appeal from the Board of Review was brought, under section
4
51, sub-section 6, before Mr. Justice Starke of the High Court.Y
In giving judgment Mr. Justice Starke stated that the board, in
its proceedings, does not exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth, but an administrative function, namely, that of reviewing the Commissioner's assessments. An appeal from such
a Board is therefore a proceeding in the original jurisdiction of
the High Court, and the parties to the appeal are not limited to the
material which was before the Board, but are entitled to adduce
such evidence as is relevant in support of, or in answer to, the
appeal. 55
III.

THE INTER-STATE

COMMISSION

Section ioi of the Constitution provides that
"There shall be an Inter-State Commission, with such
powers of adjudication and administration as the Parliament deems necessary for the execution and maintenance,
On the same ground, he believed the Boards of Appeal also to have been
validly created under the Act of 1922.
r4 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Lewis Berger & Sons, Ltd., 39 C.
L. R. 468.
C In considering a similar appeal from a Board of Review in 1928, the High
Court held that the whole of the decision was open to review, and not merely
the question o.f law, since the case was within the original jurisdiction of the
High Court. Ruhamah Property Co., Ltd., v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation, 41 C. L. R. 148 (1928).
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within the Commonwealth, of the provisions of this Constitution relating to trade and commerce, and of all laws
made thereunder."
Section 103 provides that the members of this commission shall
be appointed by the Governor-General, shall hold office for seven
years, shall be removable only on the address of both Houses of
Parliament, and shall not have their remuneration diminished during their continuance in office.
In 1912, Parliament passed the Inter-State Commission Act,
Part V of which, entitled "The Judicial Power of the Commission", constituted the Inter-State Commission a court of record
with power to grant injunctions. In 1915, an order was issued by
the commission, on the complaint of the Commonwealth, enjoining the state of New South Wales from taking certain action
under its Wheat Acquisition Act of 1914. New South Wales
appealed to the High Court,50 challenging the jurisdiction of the
commission to make such an order. It was contended that the
effect of the provisions of Part V of the Inter-State Commission
Act was to create a court, that such a court could not be validly
created by Parliament, because it did not conform to the provisions of chapter III of the Constitution, and that consequently
Part V of the Act was invalid. This contention was upheld by a
majority of the High Court. The majority believed that any
federal court must conform to section 72 of the Constitution
which provided for a life tenure of judges, and that sections ioi
and 102 could not be read as exceptions to that provision. Section 103 of the Constitution, in the opinion of the court, suggested
that the intention of the Constitution was not to create a court.
Chief Justice Griffith stated that
"the functions of the Inter-State Commission contemplated
by the Constitution are executive or administrative, and the
powers of adjudication intended are such powers of determining questions of fact as may be necessary for the performance of its executive or administrative functions, that is,
such powers of adjudication as are incidental and ancillary
to those functions." '7
ISupra note 3.

Supra note 56, at 64.
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Justices Barton and Gavan Duffy disagreed with this decision, holding that the wording of sections l1-1o3 of the Constitution clearly assigned to Parliament the power to decide what
kind of adjudicatory or administrative functions were necessary
to equip the commission for the execution and maintenance of
the provisions indicated. The determination of Parliament could
not be questioned in the High Court.
Thus the majority in this case established the highly important rule that chapter III of the Constitution contains a gift of
the whole judicial power of the Commonwealth, and that section
IOI must therefore deal only with power other than judicial
power.5
The High Court has held consistently to this interpretation.
IV.

THE DEPORTATION BOARD

Section 8A of the Immigration Act, as amended in 1920,
provides for the deportation from Australia of certain classes of
immigrants and sets up for that purpose a board of three members
with power to recommend such deportation to the Minister for
Home and Territories. If the board recommends that a person
be deported, "the Minister may make an order for his deportation". This, in effect, makes the order of the minister final.
In 1923, Michael O'Flanagan and John J. O'Kelly went to
Australia from Ireland. After they had been arrested on a
charge of being engaged in seditious enterprises, they were summoned to appear before the above-mentioned board to show
cause why they should not be deported. The two immigrants
Mr. Justice Isaacs, who, in both earlier and later cases, has shown a
deeper insight into the implications of the modern developments in administrative
law than most of the justices, appears in this case as the champion of the separation of powers. His opinion is one of the few in the Australian reports which
contains an abstract formulation of a theory of the separation of powers. He
points out that the Constitution has "delimited with scrupulous care the three
great branches of government," and quotes Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman
v. Southard, io Wheat. I, 46 (U. S. 1825): "The difference between the departments undoubtedly is, that the legislature makes, the executive executes,
and the judiciary construes the law." "That describes," says Mr. Justice Isaacs,
"the primary functions of each department, though there may be incidents to
each power which resemble the other main powers buf are incidents only."
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applied to the High Court 59 for an injunction against the members of the board, restraining them from proceeding further in
respect to the summons to appear before the board. One of the
grounds upon which they relied was that section 8A was invalid
because it attempted to vest in the board a portion of the judicial
power of the Commonwealth which could be exercised only by the
High Court or other federal courts created under chapter III of
the Constitution.
The High Court decided that the board was not a judicial
tribunal with power to give a decision declaring a right or obligation. Its functions were ministerial. The creation of such a
board was within the power of the Commonwealth Parliament to
make laws with respect to immigration and emigration, conferred
by section 51 (xxvii) of the Constitution."0
V.

TERRITORIAL COURTS

In 1915, a case was stated for the opinion of the High Court
by the Central Court of Papua, a territory of the CommonIn the course of the proceedings, on petition of the
wealth."'
accused, the case was treated as an appeal from the conviction.
It was contended for the accused that he was entitled to a trial by
jury on an indictment for an offence against a law of the Commonwealth under section 8o of the Constitution. The court held,
however, that section 122 of the Constitution, granting power to
'-'Rex v. Macfarlane et al. sub nomnhw Ex parte O'Flanwgan, 32 C. L. R. 518
(1923).
C' This decision was followed in Ex parte Walsh and Johnson; In re Yates,
37 C. L. R. 36 (1Q25), in which section 8AA of the Immigration Act of 19o11925, providing for the use of the same procedure in deporting persons who
menaced industrial peace in Australia, was declared to be a valid exercise of
the legislative power conferred by § 51 (xxvii) of the constitution. Cf. the following United States cases: Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 13
Sup. CL ioi6 (1893) ; Un.ted States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. i6I, 24 Sup. Ct.
621 (904) ; United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 25 Sup. Ct. 644 (19o5) ;
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 42 Sup. Ct. 492 (1922). Cf. also Ex
parte O'Brien [1923] 2 K. B. 361; Union Government v. Fakir, [19231 So.
Afr. Rep. App. Div. 466.
' Rex. v. Bernasconi, 19 C. L. R. 629 (i9i5). Sec. i of Ordinance No.
VIII of 19o9 of Papua provided that the Central Court must, under certain circumstances, reserve any question of law which arose in the trial of an accused
person, for the consideration of the High Court. Sec. 43 of the Papua Act of
19o5 expressly granted an appeal to the High Court.
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Parliament to make laws for the government of a territory, was
not restricted by section 8o of the Constitution.
"In my judgment", said Chief Justice Griffith, "chapter
III (of the Constitution) is limited in its application to the
exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth in respect of those functions of government as to which it stands
in the place of the States, and has no application to the terri-

tories."

62

This opinion seemed to make it clear that none of the sections of chapter III would apply to a territory, and that no court
established in any territory would be a federal court from which
an appeal would lie to the High Court under section 73 of the
Constitution. In 1918, however, an appeal from the decision of
a special magistrate in the Northern Territory was brought to
the High Court, 63 on the assumption that his court was a federal
court within the meaning of section 73 of the Constitution. Chief
Justice Griffith, in delivering judgment, found it unnecessary to
discuss or decide this question, saying merely that the contention
was open to grave doubt.
By the Judiciary Ordinance of 1921-1922,64 made under
the authority of the New Guinea Act of 1920, section 14, a Central Court was established for the mandated territory of New
Guinea, and an appeal was allowed to the High Court. The New
Guinea Act had been passed under the authority of section 122 of
the Constitution. In a case arising in 1924,60 Mr. Justice Isaacs
showed that there was a connected chain of authority, starting

with the Imperial Treaty of Peace Act of

1919,66

which em-

powered the King to accept the mandate for Australia, and leading
to the Ordinance of 1922 which endowed the court with the necessary appellate jurisdiction. The mandate 67 had provided that the
. Supra note 6I, at 635.
' Mitchell v. Barker, 24 C. L. R. 365.
0' Ordinance No. 3 of 1921, cl. 7, and No. 22 of 1922, cl. 24; see II Comm.
STAT. RuLEs 276 (I92i)), and 12 ibid. 400, 415 (922).
' Mainka v. Custodian of Expropriated Property, 34 C. L. R. 297 (1924).
W9

& io Geo. V, c. 3 (919).

' The mandate was made Dec. 17, I92O, by the League of Nations Council,
and recited that His Majesty, for and on behalf of the Government of Australia,
had agreed to accept it.
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Commonwealth should have "full power of administration and
legislation over the territory . . . as an integral portion of the
Commonwealth of Australia . . ." Hence the Central Court
in question is a federal court, though not under the sole authority
of section 122.
Even after the Mainka case, therefore, the question remained
unsettled whether a court established in a territory under the
sole authority of section 122 is a federal court from which an
appeal lies to the High Court under section 73 of the Constitution.
Porter v. The King; Ex parte Yee," s in 1926, raised the
question again, in an appeal from the Supreme Court of the
Northern Territory. It was contended, under the authority of
Rex v. Bernasconi,that the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory was not a federal court from which an appeal would lie to
the High Court under section 73, since the judge had not a life
tenure, and since the Act of i9ro,69 which authorized the creation
of the court, was enacted under section 122 of the Constitution.
Mr. Justice Isaacs and three other justices derived from the Bernasconi case the general principle that section 122 granted a
plenary authority to the Commonwealth Parliament unlimited by
the judicature sections of the Constitution. In their opinion,
therefore, Parliament may, under section I22, confer at will appellate jurisdiction from a territorial court. The Bernasconi case
was taken to mean that the judicial power of the Commonwealth
was that of the Commonwealth proper, that is, the area included
within the states, not that of the territories. It followed that, with
an appropriate Parliamentary enactment, such as the Act of 191o
was deemed by the majority judges to be, the High Court was
competent to entertain appeals from territorial courts.' °
c'37 C. L. R. 432 (1926).

The court was cre' Northern Territory (Administration) Act, sec. 13.
ated by the Supreme Court Ordinance of 1911 made under the authority of the
Act of i91o. See 3 Comm. STAT. RuI.Es 425 (I9xi).
"Chief Justice Knox and Mr. Justice Gavan Duffy dissented. See, however, the dictunz of Chief Justice Knox in Edge Creek Pty. Ltd. v. Symes, 43
C. L. R. 53 (1929), in which he holds that the Central Court of New Guinea
is not a federal court from which an appeal would lie to the High Court under
§ 73 of the Constitution.
The courts established by Congress in the territories of the United States,
even including Alaska, Porto Rico and Hawaii, have a limited tenure and are not
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Here the matter remains. It seems to be fairly definitely
settled that any territorial court is to be regarded as created under
the plenary powers conferred to that end upon Parliament in section 122 of the Constitution, and that such courts need not conform in either their constitution or their procedure to the provisions of chapter III.
VI. PUBLIC SERVICE TRIBUNALS

The Commonwealth Public Service Act of 1922, as amended
in 1924 and 1928, provides for the control of the civil service
of the Commonwealth."
It sets up a Board of Commissioners
with wide powers over appointments and promotions and over the
72
organization of the departments.
Section 50 of the Act, as amended in 1924, provides that the
permanent head of any department in which a vacancy occurs may
transfer or promote an officer to fill the vacancy, such promotion
being provisional, pending confirmation by the board, and subject
to a right of appeal to the board by other officers with claims to
promotion. In case of such an appeal, "the Board shall make full
inquiry into the claims of the appellant, and those of the officer
provisionally promoted, and shall determine the appeal." No
further appeal is provided for.
The Act also sets up a procedure for dealing with offences
by officers of the public service. In the case of minor offences,
the decision of the chief officer of the department, imposing the
penalty authorized by the Act, is final. 73
Where offences are serious, a more elaborate procedure is
adopted. Where there is reason to believe that an officer (other
regarded as created under Art. III of the Constitution. See American Insurance
Co. v. Canter, i Pet. 511, esp. at 546 (U. S. 1828) ; also United States v. Fisher,
109 U. S. 143, 3 Sup. Ct. 154 (1883) ; McAllister v. United States, 141 U. S. 174,
ii Sup. Ct. 949 (1891).
The United States Court for China and the consular
courts are also "non-article IIr' courts, created under the powers conferred
upon Congress respecting treaties and commerce with foreign countries. In re
Ross, 14o U. S. 453, n Sup. Ct. 897 (1891) ; Fleming v. United States, 279
Fed. 613 (C. C. A. 9th, 1922).
'This Act superseded the- Commonwealth Public Service Act of 19021918.
n This board is empowered to summon witnesses, to compel testimony on
oath and to require the production of documents. See § 19 (1), (4).
Sec. 55 (2).
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than an officer of the first or second division of the service) has
committed an offence, a charge may be laid against him before the
chief officer of the department. The accused officer shall receive
a copy of the charge, and shall be directed to reply in writing,
admitting or denying the truth of the charge, and giving any explanation he wishes. The chief officer, after consideration of the
reports relating to the charge and the reply, if any, of the officer
charged, may, if he finds the charge sustained, impose certain
penalties. Where the punishment imposed is other than a fine not
exceeding 12, an appeal is allowed to an Appeal Board. The
Appeal Board may confirm, annul, or vary the decision of the
chief officer, and its decision, with one exception,"4 shall be final.
A different procedure is prescribed for offences by officers
of the first or second division of the service. 5 The Minister or
permanent head of the department may suspend an officer who
is charged with an offence and report the charge to the Board of
Commissioners. If the officer does not in writing admit the truth
of the charge, the Board of Commissioners shall appoint a Board
of Inquiry to inquire into the matter and report to the Board
of Commissioners its opinion. If the charges are admitted or
sustained by the opinion of the Board of Inquiry, the Board of
Commissioners may make such recommendations as to punishment
as it thinks fit to the Governor-General. The Governor-General
may then dismiss the officer from the service, or impose any other
suitable penalty. If the charges are found to be untrue by the
Board of Inquiry, the suspension shall be removed at once .7 6
"The exception is that, when the Appeal Board considers that the officer
should be dismissed, his case shall be referred to the Board of Commissioners.
See § 55 (3), (4).
'Sec. 56.
"' Sec. 57 (1) provides that in proceedings before a Board of Inquiry or a
Board of Appeal, both the officer and the charging authority may be represented
at the hearing by counsel who may examine witnesses and address the board.
Sec. .57 (2) reads: "It shall be the duty of the Board of Inquiry or Appeal
Board to make a thorough investigation without regard to legal Sorms and
solemnities, and to direct itself by the best evidence which it can procure or
which is laid before it, whether the evidence is such as the law would require
or admit in other cases or not." Sec. 58 confers on the boards the power to
summon witnesses, take evidence on oath and require the production of documents, providing that no person will be required to answer questions which
would tend to criminate him.
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There are several observations to be made as to the nature
and functions of these tribunals. It will be noted that the Board
of Commissioners, the Board of Inquiry, the Appeal Board and
the chief officer all have power to make determinations as to
important legal rights and obligations of officers. In the case
of appeals to the Appeal Board, its decisions are final (with the
exception noted above), as are the decisions of the chief officer
in minor offences and in more serious offences where the punishment is a small fine. Though the offences in question are statutory (defined in section 55, sub-section I of the same Act), there
is no appeal to a higher court. The decisions of the Boards of
Inquiry dealing with offences committed by officers of the first
and second divisions are not final, since the Board of Commissioners and the Governor-General are empowered to exercise
their discretion regardless of the opinions of the Boards of Inquiry. The decisions, on appeal, of the Board of Commissioners
on questions of promotion and transfer are also final. In no case
is there judicial review of the decisions of these bodies.
The work of these various public service tribunals is largely
judicial in character, and judicial procedure is employed. Yet
they do not exercise part of "the judicial power of the Commonwealth". It may be said that Parliament has created these tribunals, not under chapter III of the Constitution, but under its
power to make laws "incidental to the execution of any power
vested . . . in the Government of the Commonwealth or in any

department or officer of the Commonwealth," 77 or under its power
to make laws concerning the appointment of officers of the executive government.7 8 Unlike the previous creations of Parliament
which have been discussed, the constitutional validity of these tribunals has never been challenged in the courts.
VII. COURTS OF MARINE

INQUIRY

The creation of the Courts of Marine Inquiry, under the
Navigation Act of 1912, raises a perplexing question which has
not been settled. The Act confers on these courts power to make
'Sec. 5i (xxxix).
" Sec. 67.
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inquiry as to all casualties affecting ships and as to charges of
79
incompetency or misconduct on the part of masters or officers.
Such inquiries shall be undertaken at the request of the Minister
for Trade and Customs, 0 and the court is required to forward its
decision with notes of the evidence to the Minister.8 ' But, in
addition to this mere power of inquiry, a Court of Marine Inquiry
is given such powers and is constituted in such a way as to make
it appear to be a court exercising ordinary judicial power. It is
provided that it "shall be a Court of Record and shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals, charges, complaints, inquiries and references under this Act." 82 It may "have all the
powers of a Court of summary jurisdiction in the State in which
it sits".8 3 It may award costs, 8 4 cancel or suspend the certificate
of a ship's officer,83 and commit an officer to prison for failure to
deliver up a certificate."6 It therefore has power to determine
legal rights and to enforce penalties. No provision is made, however, that the members of the court must have a life tenure of
7
office.
In view of these apparently conflicting provisions, and in
view of previous decisions of the High Court, the question arises
as to whether a Court of Marine Inquiry is a court exercising
"the judicial power of the Commonwealth". If it is intended
to be such a court, is the Act creating it unconstitutional in so far
as it fails to provide for a life tenure? This question was argued
at length by counsel in Rex v. Turner in 1927.8 But as it was
not the real question at issue, the High Court was able to decide
the case without attempting to settle it. In view of the doctrine
laid down in Alexander's case, it would seem that if the question
Sec. 364.
Sec. 365.
Sec. 367 (3).

Sec. 356 (2).
, Sec. 370.

Sec. 371.
Sec. 372.
Sec. 375.
7

Sec. 358 provides for the constitution of the court.
C. L. P- 411 (1927).

6s39
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were presented squarely to the High Court, the Courts of Marine
Inquiry would be denied the power to enforce penalties, though
such power is conferred on them by the Act. Their remaining
functions as inquiring bodies with power to summon witnesses,
etc., would remain intact, as being authorized under the interstate trade and commerce clause of the Constitution."9 Parliament could then, if it wished, create such courts with a life tenure
to exercise full judicial power.
VIII. SOME OTHER SPECIALIZED TRIBUNALS

The Customs Act of i9oi and the Excise Act of the same
year provide for settlement by the Minister of Customs of disputes with reference to any contravention of the Acts. 90 The
Minister may "impose, enforce, mitigate or remit any penalty
or forfeiture" and "every such order shall be final and without
appeal". In such cases he may summon parties and witnesses,
take evidence on oath and require the production of documents.
Under the Patents Act of 19o3, 9 ' the Commissioner of Patents is empowered to accept or refuse specifications for patents.
In case of refusal to accept specifications, an appeal is allowed
to the High Court or the supreme court of the state in which the
Patent Office is situated. If there is opposition to the granting
of the patent, the Commissioner must hear and decide the case,
and any party aggrieved may appeal from his decision to the
High Court or the supreme court of the state. On such an
appeal, the High Court or supreme court may hear the applicant
and any opponent who, in the opinion of the court, is entitled to be
Secs. 51 (I) and 98.
"Customs Act, Part XV, §§ 265-269; Excise Act, Part XIII, §§ 155-159.
A Court of Customs Appeals was established in the United States by the PayneAldrich Act of Aug. 5, 19o9, 36 STAT. 105 (IgII), 28 U. S. C. A. §3oi
(1928). Its judgments are final except that, under the Act of Aug. 22, 1914, 38
STAr. 703 (I915), 28 U. S. C. A. § 308 (1928), the Supreme Court has appel-

late jurisdiction in cases involving the interpretation of the Constitution or
treaties. It is a "legislative court," created under the power of Congress to
lay and collect duties. Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U. S. 438, 458, 49 Sup. Ct.
411, 416 (i2g9).
JSecs. 43-47, 57-59. The history of the movement to establish a patent
court in the United States is given in FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, op. Cit. supra
note 6, at 174-184.
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heard, and may determine whether the grant ought or ought not
to be made.
A somewhat similar procedure is set up under the Trade
Marks Act of I9O5.92

This Act empowers the Registrar of Trade

Marks, and on appeal from him, the Attorney-General or Solicitor-General, to decide upon applications for trade marks. Provision is made for the hearing of interested parties in case there
is opposition to the acceptance of the application. This, in effect,
is a power to decide important matters of both law and fact. An
appeal is allowed to the High Court from both the Registrar
and the law officer. 93 Practically the same procedure is provided
in the Designs Act of 19o6 "' for the registering of designs.
One other instance should be mentioned. Before 1927 appeals in cases of land assessments were allowed only to the courts.
In that year, Parliament amended the Land Tax Assessment
Act " to provide for Boards of Valuation and a system of appeals
similar to that established under the Income Tax Assessment Act
of 1925, which I have already described.
There is no need to try to account here for the rapid growth
of spedialized courts. Numerous writers in recent years have
stressed their increasing importance in modern government and
have speculated upon the urgent problems to which they have
given rise.9 6 Such tribunals were unnecessary in an age when
governments did little else than maintain order. Today they are
Secs. 33-35, 42-45.
'As to the duty of the High Court in hearing appeals from the registrar
or the law officer, see A. Ferguson & Co. v. D. Crawford & Co., io C. L. R.
207 (IgIO), and A. F. Pears, Ltd., v. Pearson Soap Co., 37 C. L. R. 340 (1925).
Secs. 23-25.
Sec. 44 of the amended Act. The Commonwealth Parliament has recently.
established a Federal Court of Bankruptcy to remove a heavy burden from the
ordinary courts. Parliamentary Debates (House) May 22, 1930, 2045-2046;
June 6, 1930, 2547-255o. This new court, though a specialized tribunal, is a
chapter III court with a life tenure. It is probable, of course, that Parliament,
if it wished, could create a non-chapter III court to deal with bankruptcy under
§ 51 (xvii) of the Constitution.
' ROBSON, JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1928);

DICKiNsoN, AD-

LAW (1927) ; Dickinson, Judicial
Control of Official Discretion (1928) _2Aim. PoL. Sci. REV. 275; FREUND, EX AL.,
MINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF

THE GROWTH

OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1923) ; LASKI, GRAMMAR OF

301, 389 et seq.; Tennant, Administrative Finality (1928) 6
CAN. BAR REV. 497; Lourie, Administrative Law in South Africa (1927) 44
POLITICS, (1925)

So. AFP. L. J. io.

ioo
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practical expedients for enabling governments to exercise a positive and expanding control over an increasingly complex economic society. With one or two exceptions, all the tribunals heretofore discussed have been created to deal with matters for which
ordinary judicial courts are unsuited: (a) because their procedure
is unnecessarily slow and cumbersome; or (b) because the burden of litigation would be too great; or (c) because a specialized
97
knowledge or a specialized procedure, or both, are desirable.
The rapid growth of these tribunals has brought with it, in
some instances, the possibility of arbitrary administrative action
without judicial review; yet in Australia the right of judicial
review has, in respect of most of these tribunals, been carefully
preserved,9 8 and no such serious protest against "executive justice" has occurred in that country as in Great Britain. The Australian judges, like those of England and America, have been
reluctant to yield vast powers of discretion to executive officers.
This is understandable, in part because of their traditional desire
to uphold the "rule of law", and in part because such an extension
of discretionary power is in some measure a derogation from
their own function. They, more readily than the American
judges, have abandoned, or at least have learned to qualify, the
cherished doctrine which they derived from Montesquieu and
Blackstone, perhaps because that doctrine, in its purest form, was
never so deeply fixed in their minds. They show little anxiety
7None of these reasons can account for the existence of the Deportation
Board. It seems to be thought expedient to give finality to the decisions of the
administrative department in deportation cases, on the ground that matters of
public policy are involved which are outside the domain of the courts.
Concluding their chapter on specialized courts, FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS,

op. cit. supra note 6, at 186, say: "The need for a coherent system of administrative law, for uniformity and despatch in adjudication, for the subtle skill required by judges called upon to synthesize the public and private claims peculiarly involved in administrative litigation, these and kindred considerations will
have to be balanced against the traditional hold of a single system of courts, giving a generalized professional aptitude to its judges and bringing to the review
of administrative conduct a technique and a temperament trained in litigations
between private individuals."
'While there is no review of the decisions of the Minister in deportation
cases, a slight safeguard against arbitrary action is evidently intended in the
provision that the Chairman of the Deportation Board shall be, or have been,
a judicial officer. See § 8A (3) of the Immigration Act of igoi-ig2o, and the
discussion in the Parliamentary Debates, (Senate) Mar. 25, 1920, 786-788.
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nowadays when a new instrument of government cannot be fitted
precisely into one of the three traditional categories. That is a
good sign, because, under the conditions of modem life, what
Mr. Justice Higgins once referred to as "the interdependence of
the arms of government" will increase rather than decrease. Unless the new tribunals have the protection of the judiciary, administration will be seriously hampered and the ordinary courts
will be overburdened with unnecessary litigation.

